This article from the March issue of The American Prospect, by John B. Judis, has one of the best analyses of the Bush administration's (possible) thought processes about going to war in Iraq. Not as simple as "blood for oil", but still troubling. It's clear that there's been quite a battle of wills among Bush and his advisors. There's actually a goal buried in the murk — they actually believe this will make the Middle East more stable in the long run — but it's been poorly communicated, to say the least... which in turn makes this much more of a long shot and hurts our chances at future collaboration and assistance.
"The administration's Iraq strategy may yet turn out to be a success — if, for instance, Hussein is forced into a last-minute exile. But Bush appears to have squandered an opportunity either to avoid a war or to fight one on the most favorable terms. If the administration had made clear that it would accept a disarmed Iraq without Hussein's ouster, it might have eventually forced the Iraqi dictator to comply with UN Resolution 1441. If Hussein still refused to comply, the administration would have enjoyed the broad support of a powerful coalition with which to go to war. Instead, the United States is likely to obtain at best a grudging acceptance of its war plans. And erstwhile allies, as well as implacable foes, will characterize the war as George W. Bush's attempt to take over the Middle East. In this interdependent world, that's not a reputation the United States wants to have."
